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its member nations should create an Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence (ASG-I) to bridge the gap between competing civilian and military intelligence structures. The creation of an ASG-I would both enhance the efficiency of NATO Intelligence and improve its quality by providing unity of effort. NATO already has Assistant Secretary Generals (ASGs) for several departments. However, there is not one responsible for leading intelligence. Because of this lack of NATO intelligence oversight, the organization is hampered by duplication of effort and over tasking of intelligence analysis centers for similar products. Leadership of the intelligence effort is currently the responsibility of the Deputy Secretary General (DSG), who has a myriad of duties that do not allow for a comprehensive focus on intelligence. Therefore, NATO should create an ASG-I billet to oversee its intelligence personnel, systems, and structural enablers to "enhance intelligence sharing within NATO, [and] to better predict when crises might occur…" as directed in NATO's latest Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of its Members (Lisbon, 2010) .
Enhancing the Efficiency of NATO Intelligence Under an ASG-I
For the NATO Headquarters, we welcomed progress towards a structure and organization which can best deliver informed timely advice for our consensual decision-making. We welcome the reform of intelligence support ... [The Secretary General's] review of personnel requirements will also be key in achieving demonstrable increased effectiveness, efficiency and savings.
-NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration Challenges, Public Diplomacy, and Executive Management. 3 However, there is not one responsible for leading intelligence. Because of this lack of NATO intelligence oversight, the organization is hampered by duplication of effort and over tasking of intelligence analysis centers for similar products.
Leadership of the intelligence effort is currently the responsibility of the Deputy
Secretary General (DSG), who has a myriad of duties that do not allow for a comprehensive focus on intelligence. Therefore, NATO should create an ASG-I billet to oversee its intelligence personnel, systems, and structural enablers to "enhance intelligence sharing within NATO, [and] to better predict when crises might occur…" 4 as directed in NATO's latest Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of its 2 Members (Lisbon, 2010). This thesis proposes the creation of an ASG-I that will provide NATO with the intelligence it requires to respond to the Alliance's need for timely and accurate assessments, as well as to better utilize its limited intelligence resources.
In 2008, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released an unclassified version of a 1984 article in Studies in Intelligence that described NATO Intelligence as a contradiction in terms and stated that it was designed for dysfunction. 5 The article identified that there is a lack of intelligence oversight in NATO. Since the writing of that article, NATO intelligence reform has made great strides to address this dysfunction.
Diligent and laudable work by the NATO intelligence community has resulted in several reforms that came forth from the Prague Summit of 2002. 6 However, the central question of who is in charge of NATO intelligence remains unanswered.
A key part of NATO's lack of intelligence unity of effort was summed up by a former Director of Intelligence of the International Military Staff (IMS) who stated that "Nations trump NATO," meaning that nations are ultimately in charge of Alliance affairs and policies for intelligence, not the Secretary General (SG). 7 Yet, in a day of diminishing resources, evolving threats, and the rising need for timely and relevant intelligence, this current "nations trump NATO" approach towards intelligence is ineffective. It is imperative that NATO recognize and encourage nations to consider that the time has come for serious intelligence reform under the purview of an ASG-I. Board (ISB). 12 The board only meets sporadically in response to specific issues and therefore does not provide sustained leadership for NATO intelligence. This section will briefly discuss the IU and IMS INT roles as well as those of several other entities that 4 influence the intelligence process and which provide intelligence to the NAC and the MC. 13 The core legacy body that provides NATO with agreed 14 and non-agreed   intelligence is IMS INT. IMS INT has approximately 35 personnel, with 15 devoted to analysis/production (four of which are dual hatted with the IU), about 10 to policy issues, and five or so to front office duties and the rest to niche intelligence capabilities. Their mission, according to the NATO website is described as:
IMS INT provides day-to-day strategic intelligence support to the NATO Secretary General, the NAC, the MC, the Defense Policy and Planning Committee and other NATO bodies. It collates and assesses intelligence received from NATO member countries and commands. It also develops, maintains and implements basic intelligence policy, doctrine and documents.
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Although description of IMS INT's role makes it appear that its intelligence products are widely used across NATO, in reality, its primary client is limited to the MC and therefore lacks access to the wider audience described. Of note, IMS INT also exclusively handles the NATO Intelligence Warning System (NIWS) through its Warning Secretariat. 16 The NIWS "provides warning of any developing instability, crisis, threats, risks, or concerns that could impact on security interests of the Alliance and monitors de-escalation of a crisis." 17 After a warning problem is developed, NIWS monitors it on at a monthly basis or more as required. 18 This is a critical function that can aid NATO in determining the likelihood of taking in action in a place such as Libya or Syria.
In reality, the main structure groomed to increasingly provide intelligence support is the IU. The IU provides intelligence support for the NAC and to a lesser extent the MC, mainly through written assessments and ad hoc briefings. The IU gets much of its intelligence from national civilian intelligence services which until recently mainly focused on providing NATO intelligence on counter intelligence and counter espionage 5 concerns, often in a bilateral fashion, rather than sharing the information widely among the allies. 19 The IU has grown in size and falls under the DSG's control with oversight from the Secretary General's Office. 20 …collaborate and cooperate in a joined up and integrated manner, bringing together military and civilian expertise, and connecting SHAPE Headquarters to the networked world. The current phase of Early Operating Capability will be followed by the Full Activation phase, scheduled mid-2013. 29 The CCOMC is too new to determine how the ASG-I and CCOMC could interact or perhaps benefit one another, but there is obvious profit in collaboration and the identification of clear lanes for who will provide intelligence support to the NAC and MC.
Any suggestion that CCOMC could subsume NATO intelligence support should be viewed skeptically because of the need to be physically represented in working group meetings on a daily basis to remain synchronized with NATO HQ's needs.
Defining the Problem
While challenges exist, reforms brought about by NATO summits over the past decade have greatly improved NATO's intelligence process. 30 However, reform may stagnate without an intelligence professional leading the macro effort who can bridge the existing divide between civilian and military intelligence teams. Currently NATO Intelligence oversight is (by default) thrust upon NATO's DSG who is typically a nonintelligence professional, whose responsibilities and accessibility are not adequate to the task of providing comprehensive intelligence oversight. A review of current and previous DSG biographies shows that each was a career diplomat. Although each was exposed to intelligence operations, none had any depth of experience in leading a civilian or military intelligence organization beyond the small intelligence cells that an embassy typically possesses. 31 A future DSG with in-depth intelligence experience is likely to be an exception not the rule. military officers with access to the MC were also of the opinion that intelligence is too important to leave to a non-intelligence professional without the time to devote to it. 37 As listed previously, there are multiple, often parallel, competing intelligence organization at NATO HQs. For example, the IU, the IMS INT and the SAC teams all have different leaders, do not adequately share information, and lack transparency within the NATO intelligence structure. 38 This hinders coordination of intelligence products meant to inform both the IS which is predominantly civilian, and the IMS which is predominantly military. This often leaves each with an unsynchronized, uncoordinated, and incomplete intelligence picture. This is despite the fact that both the IS and the IMS must both provide timely and accurate intelligence support to the NAC 9 and the MC, the primary bodies which carry out NATO's political and military objectives.
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Such parallel intelligence efforts waste valuable time and needlessly drain away limited resources. One European Intelligence Analyst at NATO HQ estimated that three of its intelligence organizations (IMS INT, IU, SAC) work on 75% of the same topics with only slight variations in focus. 40 These redundant efforts also impact nations as they are asked for similar information, leading to donor fatigue from nations' providing multiple intelligence responses to differing organizations at NATO HQ on the same topic (although nuanced enough to create unnecessary extra work). In some instances nations are even refusing to answer requests for information due to the deluge of repetitive and similar requests. 41 Such duplicative efforts have led to unhealthy competition and mistrust according to one former senior NATO intelligence official. One such example was illustrated by the SAC extracting information from both the IU and IMS INT, but then not sharing its draft or finished product with either organization. 42 Such lack of coordination or transparency hinders collaboration and generates an unhelpful climate of mistrust among NATO intelligence producers. While overall intelligence products and processes have improved over the years, interviews and correspondence with current and former European and U.S. intelligence analysts confirm that such themes of suspicion, competition, and paranoia persist. These unhelpful tendencies must be overcome to provide NATO decision-makers with the best intelligence products possible.
Since the threat defined in NATO's Strategic Concept is complex, there is much ground to be covered and therefore little room for duplication of effort. NATO's Strategic Concept describes the threat as: proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles;
terrorism, instability or conflict beyond NATO's borders; cyber attacks; threats to the energy supply and environmental and resource constraints. 43 Clear lanes marking who should cover each of these areas would reduce duplication of effort and better manage limited intelligence resources. Although there may be occasions for which redundant coverage is desired, but such instances should be an exception.
While some intelligence resources are being used redundantly, some technological resources are not being exploited enough. For example none of these agencies fully exploit NATOs common intelligence system Battlefield Information
Collection and Exploitation System (BICES). BICES was designed to enhance intelligence collaboration and distributing of intelligence. The underuse of BICES inadvertently leads to the NAC and the MC receiving disjointed intelligence analyses.
Compounding the problem is the fact that all these units are not co-located or even near each other. Physical separation, especially in a building such as NATO HQ tends to build an invisible barrier, no matter how unintentional.
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The Solution
To coordinate these diverse and at times redundant organizations and interests, NATO should appoint an ASG-I, with a professional intelligence pedigree to oversee the various intelligence teams at NATO and to coordinate NATO's national intelligence contributions. The ASG-I must be empowered with the proper authorities to lead these various intelligence agencies and also must have the complete trust, confidence and backing by of the SG and the Chairman of the Military Committee (CMC) to make this work. 45 
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Potential ASG-I Structure Based upon multiple interviews and experience at NATO 46 , the optimal method of birthing the ASG-I would be to integrate the IU, SAC, and IMS INT positions to form the baseline ASG-I structure. 47 The IU and IMS INT should be integrated, working off the same information flow, fusing their products, and providing internally consistent policy and substance input to the IS and IMS. 48 Integrating the IU and IMS INT would allow for member nation civilian and military intelligence agencies to contribute to the overall assessments of NATO's threats.
While Regardless of which nationality is selected, an ASG-I must have a professional intelligence background with significant stature and experience in both civilian and military intelligence matters given NATO's current slate of military operations, and the expectation that these will only increase over time given the scope of NATO's Strategic Concept. 52 A highly desirable candidate would be an individual who was perhaps in 13 charge of a NATO nation's civilian or military intelligence organization and who would be able to work with nations foreign services (especially in cases which civilian and military organizations will not cooperate). 53 Rank and prestige are important and without the requisite credentials, an ASG-I could quickly become marginalized and ineffective at finessing these awkward situations. personnel. This is a small price to pay for the intelligence collaboration and effectiveness.
Enablers
The success of an ASG-I hinges on two types of enablers: technological and organizational. Technological enablers are those which exploit technology which enhance the ASG-I's mission of coordinating and overseeing NATO's intelligence flow.
The key technological enabler is the BICES system which is discussed below. The organizational enabler is concerned with the physical placement of the team.
NATO civilian and military entities should enhance the use of BICES, NATO's common system to share intelligence. At present, the military intelligence community within and supporting NATO uses BICES on an inconsistent basis, which inhibits the smooth and timely flow of intelligence. Many NATO nations do not have BICES in their capitals and would have to fund its acquisition. 60 An ASG-I should encourage and reward use of BICES by showcasing the timely, accurate and predictive intelligence products found on the system. The ASG-I would also be at the appropriate level to develop a wider implementation of BICES.
For example, though the U.S. produces most of the intelligence releasable to NATO, it does not electronically feed most of its releasable material on BICES in a timely manner. A central point of contact such as the ASG-I would work towards a solution to get nation's intelligence onto BICES in a timely manner. A recently retired U.S. European Command J-6 said NATO must expand technologies such as BICES so they serve as bridges between how the U.S. and its NATO allies process information.
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The ASG-I could use BICES internally for collaboration especially with SHAPE and with the NIFC in the UK.
Another important use of BICES would be the creation of an ASG-I produced intelligence digest that showcases and fuses nations' intelligence and answers NATO's strategic intelligence requirements. Rather than NATO HQ intelligence analysts conducting independent analysis based on raw intelligence they could provide the NAC, MC and nations with a comprehensive assessment based on nations' timely input, providing fused but at times dissenting and alternative views.
For the ASG-I to enhance its oversight of NATO intelligence operations, its teams should be co-located. As the new NATO HQ is being constructed now, planning should be enacted for this to occur in the present and future HQ. Cooperation must improve and be encouraged amongst all these organizations and in some instances memoranda of understanding between organizations should be reviewed, updated or established where necessary.
Alternative View
An alternative view (beyond the status quo) to the integration proposed, is for the ASG-I structure to take the IU structure and turn it into the ASG-I and the IMS INT remaining a non-integrated independent entity providing direct support to the MC.
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This view was put forth by some people interviewed from the IMS, but is not considered ideal because it perpetuates too much separation to become effective. This also risks an internally inconsistent intelligence picture presented to the NAC and MC and does not go far enough in fully achieving intelligence reform.
While this alternative might give intelligence greater priority in NATO and would ensure the MC is fully supported, it might still inadvertently promote competition and redundancy in intelligence at NATO HQ. Furthermore, because the IU does not have that many permanent members, it might be unable under austerity measures to keep all the staff it does have intact. As stated earlier, the IU is largely staffed by VNCs. A core of these VNC billets or all of the permanent IU billets would have to be protected and retained to make the ASG-I work. It could be difficult to convince NATO and its nations to fund such manning on a permanent basis. 63 Such a proposal would not mitigate donor fatigue as it would still allow for multiple organizations to task the same nations with very similar requests for intelligence. Therefore this construct would not solve the underlying problems of mistrust and competition which have led to redundancy, and at worst, a disjointed intelligence view.
Existing Model for NATO ASG-I Prior to 9/11, domestic U.S. intelligence agencies suffered from redundancy and stove piping, and were unable to "connect the dots" on intelligence threats, specifically those related to the homeland. To address these failures, the U. Each of these attributes is discussed in detail below.
Envisioning the Future (Vision)
Any NATO ASG-I would need to employ environmental scanning to create a "vision that is aligned with a best estimate of the future environment" to provide intelligence support to NATO. 70 In envisioning the future he must have access to and use all of the resources from the different national-level intelligence agencies and organizations within and in support of NATO. The ASG-I's objective would be to synchronize these varying analyses to inform NATO's strategic goals and priorities. As uncertainty increases, NATO Intelligence teams must be structured and empowered to collaboratively monitor ongoing trends, forecast future scenarios, and consider potential wildcard events. 71 A key role of an ASG-I would be to mitigate the two types of decision-makers' reactions to crises: denial and defensiveness. Denial is defined as the refusal to believe that certain potentials exist. Defensiveness is an opposite reaction from denial in which the leader takes a passive approach, hoping the crisis will abate without intervention. 72 An intelligence professional must influence strategic leaders to recognize when they are in denial or defensiveness modes. Effective forecasting of wildcard scenarios and developing and monitoring of indicators associated with them, can aid in communicating their existence to decision-makers, when such situation exists. This in turn can prepare an organization to influence the response to a surprise. 73 With the DSG overseeing intelligence at NATO, it is more likely for denial and defensiveness to occur. However, an empowered ASG-I would have the access to communicate the gravity of a particular crisis to NATO senior bodies.
To mitigate decision-makers' potential to respond inadequately to a crisis, an ASG-I would first direct his intelligence organizations to scrutinize data and trends for unforeseen types of events before or while they are occurring. This is a daunting task.
To offer NATO leaders a truly useful and comprehensive intelligence picture, an ASG-I would need to choreograph the intelligence gathering and analysis efforts of the 'stove-piped,' and redundant NATO intelligence units, to maximize their intelligence gathering
potential.
An ASG-I could better direct the current effort by eliminating redundant efforts and assigning NATO's limited internal intelligence analysis resources to monitor a broader spectrum of potential threats. An ASG-I would also have the professional insight to know which assets are best applied against which intelligence priorities. He would have to be familiar with each NATO member's national capabilities and contributions to the overall effort, as well as with the complex NATO structure itself.
Developing Relationships
To develop the relationships necessary to harmonize NATO's intelligence efforts, the ASG-I must be cross-culturally savvy enough to operate in a multicultural and multiorganizational environment. Leadership expert Angela Febbraro says that leaders in multinational environments "must be persuasive, not coercive and sensitive to national [and organizational] needs." 74 An ASG-I should strive to eliminate the potential for 'haves and have nots' in the NATO intelligence structure. For example, cliques among certain nations which share particular intelligence capabilities, have English as their first language (US, Canada, UK) or whose alliances pre-date NATO, must be avoided at NATO. Such cliques would alienate other members and cause unnecessary friction to the process. 75 It would be essential for the ASG-I to foster a sense of organizational inclusiveness and trust.
Leading a multinational organization is more demanding and difficult than leading a national one. 76 One such multinational leader is NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), Admiral James Stravridis, says that in such an environment that "walls don't work." According to the Atlantic Council the Admiral also said that, "…21st
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Century security cannot be about walls, [and] that is must be about building bridges between people, organizations, and nations." 77 This is exactly what the ASG-I must strive to do within the NATO intelligence apparatus. Strategic leaders must know how to operate in a multicultural environment to gain the full understanding and commitment of their subordinates and partners.
Trust is essential as a foundation for the ASG-I success. His responsibility for developing, earning, and maintaining trust, both horizontally and vertically, cannot be overstated. Trust is especially important in the intelligence business and more so in a multicultural environment. Contributors want certainty that their information will be acted on when appropriate, that it will be protected, and that they will get credit for their effort. If donor information is not used or is misused, trust will be diminished or To foster trust and multicultural cooperation an ASG-I must build a heterogeneous team to lessen the potential for in and out groupings. Heterogeneous teams emphasize rules and practices that are inclusive rather than exclusive, and tend
to be more open to ideas and inputs. 81 Heterogeneous groups should include intelligence representatives from as many different countries as possible. It may also encourage a greater willingness by nations to contribute more intelligence, in the hope of demonstrating their value-added to the overall effort.
As the ASG-I builds bridges to support intelligence reform, it will be important for him to have a thorough understanding of the each agency and allies capabilities and weaknesses, and he must be attuned to each ally's and partner's political sensitivities. 82 For instance, when NATO is deciding whether to intervene in a crisis such as those in Libya or Syria, an ASG-I must understand allied nations' past and present relationships with those states and their capabilities for contributing meaningful intelligence. In NATO's intelligence environment, an ASG-I would spend much of his time engaging other nations to ensure intelligence is contributed from each nation. In working with allies it is essential to build consensus, as peers do not respond to one another's orders. 93 Developing relationships takes time. As such, the NATO ASG-I would need to aggressively pursue a boundary spanning approach to develop them.
Gerras notes "boundary spanning involves collaborating with others outside the team, scanning the environment, and negotiating resources for the team." 94 The ASG-I should boundary span to cultivate relationships that exploit allied intelligence niche capabilities such as HUMINT in a region that no one else has.
One example of leveraging a nation's intelligence support is illustrated by a recent visit of a senior NATO intelligence official to a new East European NATO member nation. During this visit, the NATO official was asked by the country's National
Intelligence Chief to comment on his countries contribution to NATO intelligence. The NATO official candidly responded that the new ally was not in fact contributing intelligence to NATO, and followed up this revelation with a polite request that it begin doing so. Shortly thereafter, a small but steady niche stream of intelligence started to flow from that country. 95 An ASG-I would be in an excellent position to identify such gaps in intelligence contribution and address them early on to ensure NATO is exploiting all potential contributions to its intelligence picture.
Much of an ASG-I's power will rest on his level expertise and his referent authority gained from respect for his ability to operate effectively in a multinational environment. 96 At a more microcosmic level the ASG-I must apply relationship skills to his own team. It will be incumbent on an ASG-I to make his analysts feel they are part 27 of a heterogeneous, collaborative team that has a sense of loyalty to NATO's mission not just to their national capitals.
Conclusion
Dr. Paul Piller, a former senior Central Intelligence Agency official, reflected that "resources are limited; threats are not." 97 Though NATO faces a limited resource environment, the threats with which it must concern itself continue to grow. It should therefore appoint an ASG-I now to lead an integrated intelligence structure at NATO that takes a strategic, macro-level approach to maximizing limited resources for maximum efficiency.
In these fiscally strained times, the ASG-I proposal is a more efficient use of This intelligence professional must also be able to envision and apportion assets against likely areas of concern. A frank and open working relationship is imperative between the ASG-I and the SG, the NAC and the MC to ensure NATO is getting the most comprehensive intelligence possible. Furthermore, a NATO ASG-I must excel at building multinational relationships based on trust. An ASG-I must promote organizational inclusiveness, not exclusiveness, to tear down existing walls.
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The ASG-I requires NATO leadership and nations' trust and confidence to lead his team to answer the intelligence requirements for NATO. This support must also come from NATO's Intelligence Committees, both the CIC and the Military Intelligence Committee (formerly the NATO Intelligence Board). Whenever these committees meet, 98 the ASG-I must be engaged and able to champion NATO's intelligence needs, to include the needs of individual allies to help them contribute.
Only someone at an ASG level or higher would be capable of accomplishing a strategically-minded approach to reforming and properly coordinating NATO's current intelligence processes to maximize their overall effectiveness. Should NATO nations fail to demand that an ASG-I position be created they risk a greater failure in achieving intelligence ambitions set forth in their latest strategic concept.
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